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The Place for Prisoners in EU Law? 
 
Leandro Mancano* 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, a territorially unbounded power to imprison individuals within the EU has been developing. 
Such a dynamic has significantly impacted on EU citizenship law, which in turn has been strengthened by 
basing on residence the conferral of many rights. In this paper, I investigate what role prison and prisoners can 
have in EU law, with specific regard to EU citizenship. In order to answer such a question  two scenarios are 
outlined, which embody the ways in which detention and Union citizenship have intertwined hitherto. Firstly 
are intersections between EU-grounded detention and EU citizenship. This group includes actual connections 
(as is the case of Wolzenburg Koslowski, Lopes Da Silva and I. B. CJEU’s decisions), as well as interplays 
which have not concretised yet (as shown by the Framework Decisions on transfer of prisoners and on proba-
tion measures). On the other, the mutual influence between state-grounded detention and EU citizenship. Re-
cent CJEU cases such as Onuekwere and M. G. demonstrate that detention is capable of significantly affecting 
the rights provided for by EU citizenship. By reading these two scenarios through the conceptual couple inte-
gration/reintegration, I show strengths and weaknesses of the conditions of prisoners as EU citizens. 
 
 
Research question and plan of the article 
What role can prison and prisoners have in EU law?  I shall clarify the context, scope and structure of my 
research. Firstly and foremost, I focus on criminal law detention. Though I acknowledge  that administrative 
detention (such as immigration detention) is highly relevant to EU citizenship, I pay attention only to that kind 
of deprivation arising from criminal proceedings. Secondly, by the terms power to imprison/detain/deprive of 
liberty, I refer to: the choice to resort to detention made by the (EU or national) legislatures; the enforcement 
of a detention order or of a custodial sentence, especially in the context of judicial cooperation within the EU. 
Thirdly, I link my analysis to EU citizenship. This status rests on the right to move and reside freely across the 
EU without being discriminated on grounds of nationality. Needless to say, this has huge consequences on the 
importance of the nationality link, from the viewpoint of both states and individuals. On the one hand, every 
EU citizen can ‘hang the hat’ in a Member State other than that of nationality, and acquire a set of rights which 
blurs the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens of that Member State. On the other hand, EU citizenship 
brings with it the obligation, for the states concerned, to recognise those rights, without favoring their own 
nationals in the absence of a lawful justification.  
                                                 
* PhD Law student at Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the bEU Citizens 
Conference, held in Zagreb on 29-30 June 2015. I wish to thank Giuseppe Martinico and all participants for their sugges-
tions. I also would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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Against that background, I am interested in understanding the effects that the status of EU citizenship can have 
on persons in detention. To this end, an exhaustive response requires the analysis of two complementary sce-
narios. The first scenario focuses on the possibility for the detainee to execute a custodial sentence or a deten-
tion order where s/he has the higher level of connection. This thread is mostly shaped by interactions between 
EU criminal law and EU citizenship. One can distinguish: actual interactions, represented by the Kozlowski, 
Wolzenburg, Lopes Da Silva and I. B. decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the CJEU’ or 
the ‘Court’); and interactions which have not yet taken place, such as those involving the Framework Decisions 
(FDs) on the Transfer of Prisoners and on Probation Measures. 
The second scenario deals with the question as to whether, to what extent and with what consequences, the 
commission of a criminal offence breaks the link which ties the wrongdoer to the state where s/he has moved 
to. In this scenario national criminal law meets EU citizenship, resulting in a CJEU case-law (Tsakouridis, P. 
I., Onuewkere and M. G.) concerned with the impact of custodial sentences on EU citizenship rights. The two 
scenarios are strictly intertwined. In these respect, I submit that it is key reading them in light of the conceptual 
couple integration/reintegration. As I explain, giving the chance to serve a custodial sentence or a detention 
order in the host Member State is based on reintegration purposes. On the other hand, being granted that chance 
comes with an assessment of the degree of the integration of the person concerned in that state. However, one 
cannot ignore that imprisonment can heavily impact on that integration assessment. This affects in turn the 
possibility to spend prison time in a given state, and also more generally the achievement of EU citizenship 
rights. Therefore, one can see that the relationship between the two scenarios is a circular one. Likewise, an-
swering my research question helps understanding not only of the impact of EU citizenship law on detention, 
but also the condition of detainees in EU citizenship (as EU citizens). 
This article is structured into four parts. Firstly, I contextualize the power to detain at EU level, by making 
reference to the evolution occurred in this respect over recent decades. In this part I show the growing interac-
tion between detention and EU citizenship, with particular regard to the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Secondly, I focus on EU citizenship law: Treaty pro-
visions and Directive 2004/38/EC (or ‘the Citizenship Directive’)1. I hereby explain why integration and rein-
tegration are key to answering my research question. Furthermore I underline how they, and the broader system 
of EU citizenship, have a centerpiece in the concept of residence. Thirdly, I analyse the two scenarios against 
the conceptual yardstick of integration and reintegration. As to the first scenario (interaction between EU crim-
inal and EU citizenship), I place my analysis in the broader context of the principle of mutual recognition in 
EU criminal law. By paying special attention to the case of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) FD, I show 
how that principle has significantly diminished the importance of nationality to detention and criminal law at 
EU level. Then I examine the actual and potential interactions, by highlighting strengths and weaknesses of 
the relevant EU law from the perspective of detainees’ rights. I precede the discussion of the second scenario 
                                                 
1 Directive 2004/38/CE of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158/77, 30 April 2004.  
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(national criminal law interplaying with EU citizenship) with the outline of the background of the recent de-
velopment in the Court’s approach to integration and EU citizenship. Then I move on to the judgments relevant 
to the specific topic of this paper. In the last part I take the stock of the overall analysis carried out. I conclude 
that the salience of nationality has significantly decreased when it comes to detainees and EU citizenship. This 
is especially the case of the reintegration of the person concerned. Furthermore, I maintain there is an ongoing 
involution of the Court’s case-law, with regard to the relationship between imprisonment and integration of 
the detainee in the host Member States.  
 
 
1. The power to detain at EU level 
Citizenship and the state’s decision to detain an individual share a number of important features. Firstly, they 
historically represent two strongholds of national identity. Though different and interdisciplinary perspectives 
may be adopted to deal with citizenship, the legal approach usually looks upon it as a combination of two 
elements2. On the one hand citizenship as a status, linking the state to its citizens. On the other, citizenship as 
bearer of a complex of rights enjoyed by citizens3. Likewise, detaining individuals is inextricably linked to a 
cultural and societal context which takes a legal shape through the channel of sovereignty4. Deprivation of 
liberty perhaps represents the most ‘classical’ expression of state sovereignty over the individual, which in 
turn reveals its very nature in the use of the monopoly of force. As Max Weber put it5, a state is a community 
that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, the sole source of the ‘right’ to 
use violence. Since the Enlightenment reform, the role of national parliaments is key to the decision to deprive 
individuals of their liberty. As an expression of popular sovereignty, they mirror the social sensitiveness of a 
nation in a given historical moment. This aspect is particularly important when dealing with criminal law, the 
area which par excellence is seen as embodying the outcome of states’ cultural development. The arguments 
backing such viewpoint are perfectly epitomised by the 2009 Lisbon judgment issued by the German Consti-
tutional Court6. 
                                                 
2 D. Kochenov, Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship And The Difficult Relationship Between Status And Rights, in The 
Columbia Journal of European Law (CJEL), V 15/no 2, p. 175-176. 
3 However Kochenov, op. cit., found that the relationship between status and rights may be flexible, and another distinction is possible 
to be drawn between “ ‘formal’ citizenship, resting on the status, and ‘informal’ citizenship, emphasising the importance of the possi-
bility of enjoying citizenship rights as opposed to the importance of possessing the formal legal status of a citizen”.  
4 As to the relationship between personal liberty and sovereignty, a fundamental contribution is represented by G. Amato, Individuo e 
autorità nella disciplina della libertà personale, Milano: Giuffré, 1967. 
5 M. Weber, Politics as a vocation, Munich, 1919. 
6 Judgment of 30 June 2009 - 2 BvR 1010/2008, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 5/08 e 2 BvR 182/09, available at 
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630. An analysis from this perspective, see M. Böse, La sentenza della Corte costituzionale 
tedesca sul Trattato di Lisbona e il suo significato per la europeizzazione del diritto penale, in Criminalia,2009, pp. 267-301. 
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A second aspect which is shared by citizenship and deprivation of liberty is that they found a first manifestation 
at EU level with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, although incipient forms of such a framework had previously 
taken place7. Thirdly, and in connection to the second point, citizenship and decision on detention have been 
undergoing a groundbreaking change over the last decades8. The EU Treaty reforms, flanked by a conspicuous 
case-law of the Court of Justice, have resulted in unprecedented interactions between EU citizenship and de-
tention (and criminal law more in general).  
Therefore, the close connection between deprivation of liberty and state power is to be reconsidered. Such an 
evolution has been mainly triggered by the use of the principle of mutual recognition in judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters within the EU, adopted since the European Council of Tampere in 19989. As known, the 
application of mutual recognition in criminal matters is a principle borrowed from the internal market law10. 
Introduced by the CJEU with the Cassis de Dijon judgment11, it requires that a product/economic activity that 
has been lawfully produced/marketed/exercised in one Member State, should be capable of being marketed 
into another Member State without further burdens or conditions. Such a principle finds a limit in the Treaty 
exceptions (e.g. public policy or public health) and the mandatory requirements/justifications as elaborated by 
the Court of Justice (the so called ‘rule of reason’)12. Thereby, mutual recognition is mostly a sort of negative 
                                                 
7 As for pre-Maastricht citizenship, see in particular D. Kochenov and Sir R. Plender, EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an 
Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text, in 37 Eur. L. Rev. 369 (2012), pp. 369-396. Member States started cooperating 
in the fields of criminal justice and law enforcement a long time before the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. Such cooperation, mainly 
directed towards terrorism and drug trafficking, took place at a threefold level: United Nations (UN), Council of Europe (CoE). See 
M. Jachtenfuchs,J. Friedrichs, E. Herschinger, C. Kraft-Kasack, Policing Among Nations. Internationalizing the Monopoly of Force, 
Hertie School of Governance - working papers, No. 28, April 2008, pp. 8 onwards. See for instance the 1957 Convention on extradition 
(ETS 24), the 1959 Convention on mutual assistance (ETS 30) and the 1983 Convention on the transfer of prisoners (ETS 112). On 
these aspects, and for further bibliography, see S. Peers, Mutual recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council 
got it Wrong?, in Common Market Law Review, 41, 2004, pp. 6 onwards. 
8 See among many D. Kochenov, EU Citizenship Without Duties, in European Law Journal, Volume 20, Issue 4, pp. 482–498, July 
2014; M. Delmas-Marty, The European Union and Penal Law, in European Law Journal, Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 87-115; A. Bernardi, 
Principi di diritto e diritto penale europeo, in Ann. Univ. Ferrara - Sc. Giur. Nuova Serie, Vol. I1 (1988), pp. 77-213, available at 
http://giuri.unife.it/it/ricerca-1/allegati/annali/volume1988.pdf  
9 Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 october 1999, Presidency Conclusions. 
10 C. Janssen, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; J. Snell, The internal 
market and the philosophies of market integration, in C. Barnard and S. Peers (ed), European Union Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014, pp. 300-323. 
11 Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 00649. 
12 See A. Rosas, Life after Dassonville and Cassis: Evolution but No Revolution, in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (ed), The Past 
and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, 
pp. 433-446; C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 171-177, pp. 496 
onwards; Ö. İnanılır, Derogation from the Free Movement of Goods in the EU: Article 30 and 'Cassis' Mandatory Requirements 
Doctrine, in Ankara Bar Review, 2008/2, pp. 106-113. 
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integration, which facilitates the enjoyment of Treaty rights by the free movements of products and persons 
under a de-regulatory logic. 
The application of this logic to criminal law has caused a heated debate13. Indeed, in criminal matters each 
instrument of mutual recognition concerns one or more kinds of judicial decisions (arrest warrant, custodial 
sentence, probation measure) and abolishes the requirement of double criminality for a list of 32 offences. 
According to such a requirement, the conduct at the basis of the judicial act at stake must constitute an offence 
in the jurisdictions of both the requesting and the requested states. Once that requirement has been removed, 
the balance in cooperation substantially changes. Indeed, when one of these judicial decisions is issued for one 
of the 32 conducts by the Member State A (the issuing Member State) to the Member State B (the executing 
Member State), the latter has to recognise and execute the decision automatically and without any further 
formality. For those offences not included in the mentioned list, the double criminality principle remains. 
However, though the executing Member State does not treat that conduct as a crime in its own legal order, it 
may surrender the person concerned all the same, once the issuing Member State has required it. The automa-
ticity of mutual recognition in criminal matters is mitigated by mandatory and optional grounds for refusing 
the execution, as well as by specific rules leaving some discretion to the executing judge. Strictly connected 
to this application of mutual recognition is the legal approximation in substantive and procedural criminal 
matters, carried out through EU competences provided for in the Treaty14. For the purposes of the present 
discussion, Article 83(1) TFEU is worth mentioning, under which the Union can adopt criminal law directives 
in a number of areas of particularly serious criminality which have a cross-border dimension.  
                                                 
13 Among countless publications on the topic, see V. Mitsilegas, The constitutional implications of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters in the EU, in Common Market Law Review (43) 2006, pp. 1277-1311; S. Peers, Mutual recognition and criminal law in the 
European Union: has the Council got it wrong?, in Common Market Law Review (41) 2004, 5-36; S. Lavenex, Mutual recognition and 
the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy, in Journal of European Public Policy, 14:5 August 2007, pp. ; for a state-
by-state overview of the application of mutual recognition across EU area, see G. Vernimmen-Vam Tiggelen, L. Surano, A. Weyem-
bergh, The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union, Bruxelles, Editions de l’université de Bruxelles, 
2009; C. Jannsen, The Principle of Mutual Recognition, op. cit.; on mutual recognition and extraterritoriality, see Nicolaidis and Shaf-
fer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without global government, in 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 
(2005), p. 267 
14 Among the plethora of studies on approximation of EU criminal law, see A. Bernardi, L’armonizzazione delle sanzioni in Europa: 
linee ricostruttive, in G. Grasso, R. Sicurella (ed), Per un rilancio del progetto europeo. Esigenze di tutela degli interessi comunitari 
e nuove strategie di integrazione penale, Milano: Giuffrè, 2008, pp. 76-132; A. Klip, European Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 32; A. 
Weyembergh, L’harmonisation des législations pénales: condition de l’espace pénal européen et révélateur de ses tensions, Bruxelles: 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2004, pp. 31–36. A. Weyembergh, The function of approximation of penal legislation within the 
European Union, in 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2 (2005), pp. 149-172. A. Weyembergh, Approximation 
of criminal laws, the Constitutional Treaty and the Hague Programme, in Common Market Law Review, (42) 2005, pp. 1574 on-
wards. A similar stand is taken by A. Bernardi, Politiche di armonizzazione e sistema sanzionatorio penale, in T. Rafaraci (ed), L’area 
di libertà sicurezza e giustizia: alla ricerca di un equilibrio fra priorità repressive ed esigenze di garanzia, Milano: Giuffrè, 2007, pp. 
199 onwards. I tre volti del diritto penale comunitario, in  Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 1999, pp. 333 onwards. 
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Having outlined the broader context in which the power to detain has been developing at EU level, now I move 
on to EU citizenship law, by paying special attention to the concept of residence. Then, I hone in on integration 
and reintegration, by highlighting why: they are inextricably related to residence; they are decisive to the 
analysis of the two scenarios considered. 
 
 
2. Residence, integration and reintegration 
I contend that the conceptual couple integration/reintegration is key to understanding the role of nationality 
links in the EU approach to detention. Before going into the detailed analysis, I have to elaborate on the key 
features which lie behind these concepts: namely, the meaning of and the right to residence of EU citizens in 
the host Member State15. By right to residence, I mean the right to permanent residence in the host Member 
State. It is important to draw a distinction between the concept of legal residence and the right to residence. 
They are inextricably linked, but the former is a logic prior to the latter. The having spent a given timeframe 
of legal residence in a host Member State allows the achievement of right to residence and many other rights. 
Furthermore, it outlines the scope of application of important provisions of EU law. This may hold true for 
those EU criminal law instruments discussed in this article, namely the EAW16, the transfer of prisoners and 
the probation measures FDs17. Residence is also essential to EU citizenship, and in particular the Citizenship 
Directive. As Kochenov argues, only a limited number of rights is uniquely associated with the status of citi-
zenship as such. One of these is residence security, namely the unconditional right to enter and stay in the 
territory of a polity. ‘Residence security is at the core of what the essential legal essence of the citizenship 
status is now about’, which also explains why (even the mere possibility of) being deported and expelled 
‘play(s) an essential role in outlining with clarity the scope of those who are citizens of a polity, as opposed to 
merely residents’18.  
                                                 
15 G. Davies’Any Place I Hang My Hat?’ or: Residence is the New Nationality, in European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 
2005, pp. 43–56.  
16 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States, OJ L 190/1, 18 July 2002. 
17 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application, between Member States of the European Union, 
of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention OJ L294/20, 
11.11.2009; Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions OJ L337/102, 
16.12.2008; Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their 
enforcement in the European Union OJ L327/27, 5 December 2008. 
18 D. Kochenov and B. Pirker, Deporting the Citizens Within the European Union: A Counter-Intuitive Trend in Case C-348/09, P.I. 
v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, in (2013) Columbia Journal of European Law 19:2, pp. 374 onwards. 
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Both the definition of and the right to residence are key to the law of EU citizenship in the following way. In 
a broad sense, such a status has been defined as granting every Union citizen the entitlement to move and 
reside freely within the Union regardless of their nationality19, and without requiring links to the performance 
of an economic activity20. Furthermore, EU citizenship has been related to the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality21. Such a link, established by the Court of Justice, is currently codified in Articles 
18, 20 and 21 of the TFEU, under the heading ‘Non-Discrimination and Citizenship’. On the other side, the 
Treaty provisions are further implemented by Directive 2004/38/EC22, where the rights borne by EU citizen-
ship are outlined, as well as the ways to achieve them. The Directive provides the conditions on which the 
right to free movement and residence across the EU is granted on the Union’s citizens and their family mem-
bers, independently of their nationality. The main purpose of the Directive is promoting social cohesion and 
giving Union citizens chances of integration throughout the EU. To this end, EU citizens and their family 
members  are granted the unconditional right to residence in the host Member State for a period of up to three 
months. Should the staying be longer, the right is made subject to specific requirement23. The right to perma-
nent residence, provided for in Article 16, is conferred upon Union citizens after they have legally resided for 
a continuous period (which is not affected by temporary absences) of five years in the host Member State. 
Once acquired, the right of permanent residence shall only be lost through absence from the host Member State 
for a period exceeding two consecutive years.  
The central role played by integration and residence also emerges upon analysing another feature of the system 
built on by the Directive, that is to say the protection against the expulsions. Recital 23 considers such a meas-
ure capable of seriously harming persons who have become genuinely integrated into the host Member State; 
the degree of integration and the length of residence are to be considered, when carrying out the proportionality 
test on the expulsion decision24.  
                                                 
19 Case C-224/98, D’Hoop, [2002] ECR 6191, para 28; Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31; Case C-138/02, Col-
lins, [2004] ECR I-2703, para 61 onwards. 
20 Grzelczyk, para 36-37; Case C-413/99, Baumbast, [2002] ECR I-7091, para 81. Furthermore, the possibility as to the self-standing 
status of EU citizenship came particularly to the fore lately, with the ‘family reunification saga’ fueling the debate in this respect (See 
Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-01177; Case C-256/11, Dereci [2011] ECR I-11315; Case C-434/09, McCarthy [2011] 
ECR I-03375). However, for the time being EU citizenship rights are relied upon with no regard to the exercise of free movement only 
when national measures would force individuals to leave EU territory (McCarthy, paras 50-55). For a commentary, see  A. Hinarejos, 
Citizenship of the EU: clarifying ‘Genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of citizenship rights, in Cambridge Law Journal, Volume 71, 
Issue 02, July 2012, pp. 279-282. 
21 See Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para 89. See also J. Shaw, Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of 
Integration and Constitutionalism, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2010/60, pp. 9 onwards. 
22 For a commentary, see E. Guild, S. Peers, J. Tomkin, The EU Citizenship Directive. A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014. 
23 Directive 2004/38/EC, Articles 6(1) and 7(1). 
24 Recital 23. 
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As a general requirement, every restrictive measure shall follow an individual assessment of the conduct as a 
serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society25. In particular, it is worth referring to Article 28, 
which is the main focus of the CJEU rulings hereby discussed. The mentioned provision establishes two resi-
dence-based ‘shields’ against the expulsion: according to paragraph 2, those Union citizens (or their family 
members) who have the right of permanent residence in the host Member State, may be subject to an expulsion 
measure so long as there are serious grounds of public policy or public security; the same protection is en-
hanced at paragraph 3(a), which covers Union citizens who have resided in the host Member State for the 
previous ten years, unless imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member States, justify the 
measure26. Therefore, measures adopted under Article 28(3)(a), by virtue of the reference to the imperative 
grounds (only) of public security, are strictly limited to exceptional circumstances. As a result, the Directive 
gives substance to EU citizenship, by setting the goal of an effective integration of the Union’s citizens in 
every Member State. Such an aim is mainly pursued through two complementary tools. On the one hand, the 
right to reside is defended by the guarantee not to be expelled from the host Member State; on the other, 
protection against expulsion is achieved after the person concerned has spent a determined period of residence 
therein.  
Moving on to the conceptual couple integration/reintegration, their relevance is transversal too. As shown, 
integration is an essential element of EU citizenship. Such a salience is heightened by the fact that function 
and nature of integration are far from straightforward. This uncertainty is confirmed when looking upon the 
ways in which EU citizenship is interpreted. In particular two issues arise, as far as the present discussion is 
concerned. Firstly, the extent to which (and with what consequences) prison time may show a lack of integra-
tion in the host Member on the part of the person concerned. Secondly, the relationship between integration 
and the right to residence. Whether the former is understood in relation to the latter as an aim, a requirement 
or both can make a huge difference. 
Also reintegration is relevant for a number of reasons. In particular, it is traditionally considered a fundamental 
function of criminal sanctions. This proves to be true both at national and international levels, with rehabilita-
tion being recognized by Member States’ constitutions27, as well as by the EU28 and the Council of Europe 
                                                 
25 Article 27(2). 
26 Article 28(3)(a). 
27 Concerning Germany, see Article 2 of the Law on the execution of sentences of imprisonment (Strafvollzugsgesetz). With regard to  
Spain and Italy Constitutions, see Article 25(2) and Article 27(3) respectively. 
28 European Parliament Resolution on respect for human rights in the European Union (1997) (OJ 1999 C 98, p. 279), where it is stated 
that custodial sentences must have a corrective and reintegrative function (para 78). 
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(CoE)29. On the other hand, reintegration is a crucial element of EU mutual recognition instruments on deten-
tion. In the EAW FD reintegration founds an optional ground for refusal of execution; on the other hand, it is 
the inspiring principle which imbues other FDs on the whole.  
As I show below, the fil conducteur between these two concepts is residence. In the following section I put in 
relief how they are central features to detention and citizenship at EU level (and not only), both from a legis-
lative and judicial viewpoints. 
 
 
3. Two scenarios 
3.1 Interactions between EU criminal law and EU citizenship 
The first scenario regards the interactions between EU criminal law and EU citizenship. In particular I distin-
guish between actual and potential interactions. The former have taken place in the forms of CJEU’s judg-
ments, and focused on the interpretation of the EAW FD. The latter have not yet occurred, and concern in 
particular the way in which the FDs on transfer of prisoners and on probation measures, on the one hand, and 
the Citizenship Directive, on the other, may influence each other.  
In order to better present the following analysis, I locate the following analysis in the broader context of the 
surrender of nationals. As known, the EAW (and more in general the application of mutual recognition to 
criminal matters) have constituted an actual breakthrough in mutual legal assistance between Member States30. 
The EAW is the first and most prominent instrument of mutual recognition in EU criminal law31. The stated 
purpose of the FD is that of replacing the extradition procedure with a smoother and swifter system of surrender 
between judicial authorities32. The introduction of the EAW FD has been groundbreaking for a number of 
reasons (among others, abolishing the principle of dual criminality, allocating the responsibility for the sur-
render on judicial rather than political authorities). One of the most important changes (and not only for the 
purposes of this article) is the (almost complete) drop of the prohibition for a state to extradite its own nationals 
(also referred to as ‘nationality exception’ or ‘nationality ban’). Indeed, the latter can be considered ‘a constant 
                                                 
29 See Recommendaiton No R (87) 3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 12 
February 1987 and replaced by Recommendation Rec(2006)2, adopted on 11 January 2006. See also the Convention of the Council of 
Europe on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons of 21 March 1983.  
30 For an analysis also of the policy context, see N.Keijzer, The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision between Past and 
Future, in E. Guild (ed.), Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant,  Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006; V. 
Mitsilegas, The Constitutional Implications, op. cit; S. Peers, Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law, op. cit.; S. Alegre and M. Leaf, 
Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study—the European Arrest Warrant, Euro-
pean Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, March 2004, pp. 200–217.   
31 However, other instances of this kind can also be find outside the judicial cooperation within the EU. See in this respect the Nordic 
Arrest Warrant. G. Mathisen, Nordic Cooperation and the European Arrest Warrant: Intra-Nordic Extradition, the Nordic Arrest 
Warrant and Beyond, in Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010), pp. 1–33.  
32 At the time of the adoption of the EAW FD, the instrument in force was the 1957 CoE Convention on Extradition CETS No.: 024, 
18 April 1960.  
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feature of extradition law in most civil law countries’33, and is often accompanied in international law instru-
ments by the rule aut dedere aut judicare (obligation either to extradite or to prosecute)34.  
The understanding of the non-extradition of nationals may vary. On the one hand, it is regarded as being based 
on ‘a jealously guarded conception of national sovereignty, and it presupposes the existence of sharp contrasts 
in the administration of criminal justice between states, resulting in potentially unfair treatment such prohibi-
tion constituted’35. On the other, according to some scholars the nationality exception has inherent guarantees. 
In particular, the following considerations should be borne in mind: the person has the right not to be with-
drawn from his natural judge; the state owes its subject the protection of its law; it is impossible to trust foreign 
justice systems, especially when the treatment of foreigners is stake; it is disadvantageous to be tried in a 
foreign language separated from friends, resources and character witnesses36. However the objective of creat-
ing an ever closer Union, with mutual trust playing a major role in this respect, made such arguments hardly 
tenable. Coherently with this picture, the EAW FD did not come out of the blue. Firstly, one should mention 
Article 66 of the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, which refers to the possibility for 
Member States to extradite their nationals without extradition formalities (as long as the surrendered has agreed 
before a court and s/he has been informed on his/her right to the extradition procedure). Secondly, the 1996 
EU Convention on Extradition between Member States must be referred to, which was aimed at limiting the 
possibility of application of the nationality ban. Such a gradual route was significantly stepped up by three 
main factors, so leading to the passing of the EAW: the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), which distinguishes the state-to-state extradition from the surrender to the ICC, with 
the latter excluding the possibility of a nationality exception. The Tampere Council Meeting in 1998, where 
mutual recognition was set as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU; the 
terroristic attack to the World Trade Center on 9/11/2001, urging the Union to put into effect actual EU instru-
ments to fight crime.  
As to the foundation of the removal of the nationality exception, it is interesting to note that the Commission, 
in its EAW FD Proposal, explicitly established a link by the drop of the nationality exception and EU citizen-
ship, with the latter status eroding the importance of nationality links even with regard to the surrender for 
                                                 
33 M. Fichera, The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convenience?, in European Law Journal, Vol. 
15, No. 1, January 2009, pp. 79.  
34 See, for a recent overview, the 2015 Final Report of the International Law Commission, The obligation to extradite or prosecute 
(aut dedere aut judicare). On the other had, common law systems usually authorize the extradition of their own nationals. 
35 M. Plachta, Non- extradition of nationals: A never-ending story?, in 13 Emory International Law Rev. (1999), p. 77. 
36 S. A. Williams, ‘Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death Sentence As Bases for Refusing Extradition’, 62 Interna-
tional Review of Penal Law (1991) p. 259 at pp. 260-261, citing the findings of a 1878 British Royal Commission chaired by Lord 
Cockburn. For a helpful reconstruction of the debate on the extradition of nationals, see Z. Deen-Racsmány and R. Blekxtoon, The 
Decline of the Nationality Exception in European Extradition? The Impact of the Regulation of (Non-)Surrender of Nationals and Dual 
Criminality under the European Arrest Warrant, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 13/3, pp. 
317–363, 2005.  
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detention purposes37. This nonetheless the implementation of the EAW FD at the national level, and the sub-
sequent overcoming of the nationality ban, have known a difficult path38. This can be traced back to two main 
circumstances. Firstly the heterogeneity, within the EU, of national constitutional ‘attitudes’ to the prohibition 
of extradition of nationals. In this respect, it is appropriate to highlight the different levels of ‘protection’ 
present at the time of adoption of the FD: Member States having no constitutional provisions on the subject 
matter (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom); Member 
States explicitly or implicitly allowing for the surrender of nationals under extradition procedures (Malta, 
Hungary and Sweden); Member States prohibiting the extradition of nationals (Poland and Cyprus); Member 
States which have constitutional provisions prohibiting the extradition of nationals, but at the same authorise 
international treaties to limit it (Italy, Netherlands). The picture is tangled up by the fact that often Member 
States have also a constitutional provision obliging them to comply with duties stemming from EU or interna-
tional law. 
In order to adjust their legal framework to the surrender of their own nationals, some Member States have 
amended their constitutions (Germany, Portugal and Slovenia), or have carried out para-constitutional law 
revisions (Finland). Furthermore, more than one Constitutional Court has been faced with the task of recon-
ciling the obligation to abide by EU law with its constitutional nationality ban39. By way of example, the Polish 
Constitutional Court reached a balance as follows: while annulling the national law implementing the EAW 
FD, the Court provided its decision with provisional effects, so as to allow the legislator to adopt the necessary 
amendments to the Constitution and subsequently reintroduce the annulled provision into the Polish legal sys-
tem. At the same time, the annulled provision temporarily remained in force. On the other hand, the German 
Constitutional Court declared the incompatibility of the German law implementing the EAW FD with the 
German Constitution. In particular, the German law had not implemented those optional grounds for refusal 
provided for in the EAW FD, which would have established a significant domestic factor.  
The second circumstance which has endangered the correct implementation of the EAW FD has to do with the 
FD itself, and in particular the ways in which the Member States have incorporated Articles 4(6) and 5(3). As 
I show below, a heated debate flourished as to the compatibility of these national rules with EU law. Both of 
these provisions authorise national judges to refuse the execution of a EAW. According to Article 4(6), ‘if the 
European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of execution of a custodial sentence or detention 
                                                 
37 However, this view has been strongly criticized. See in this respect F. Impalà, The European Arrest Warrant in the Italian legal 
system: Between mutual recognition and mutual fear within the European area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in 1 Utrecht Law 
Review (2005), pp.  56-78. See also the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court on the EAW FD.  
38 For specific analysis on the English and Italian case, see: J. R. Spencer, Implementing the European Arrest Warrant: A Tale of How 
Not to Do it, in Statute Law Review 30(3), pp. 184–202; L. Marin, The European Arrest Warrant in the Italian Republic, European 
Constitutional Law Review / Volume 4 / Issue 02 / June 2008, pp. 251 - 273. 
39 See J. Komárek, European constitutionalism and the European arrest warrant: In search of the limits of contrapunctual principles, 
in Common Market Law Review 44: 9–40, 2007; Z. Deen-Racsmány, The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of Nationals 
Revisited: The Lessons of Constitutional Challenges, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 14/3, 
pp. 271–306, 2006.  
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order, where the requested person is staying in, or is a national or a resident of the executing Member State 
and that State undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law’40. As 
one can easily notice, this provision does more than simply recalling the nationality exception. It added the 
condition of ‘residence’ or ‘staying in’ to the nationality link. It is exactly this ‘enlargement’ which constituted 
the main ground for strengthening EU citizenship. Under Article 5(3), execution may be refused ‘where a 
person who is the subject of a European arrest warrant for the purposes of prosecution is a national or resident 
of the executing Member State, surrender may be subject to the condition that the person, after being heard, is 
returned to the executing Member State in order to serve there the custodial sentence or detention order passed 
against him in the issuing Member State’.  
So far, I have explained how the application of mutual recognition to EU criminal law has had the considerable 
effect of turning the nationality ban into an exception throughout the Member States legal systems. In the 
following paragraphs, I firstly analyse how the Court has understood the nationality link in relation to the 
execution of a EAW (actual interactions). In this sense, the rulings have regarded the interpretation of Articles 
4(6) and 5(3) EAW FD. I hereby highlight: the initial inconsistency of this case-law, especially when looking 
at the first two rulings (Kozlowski and Wolzenburg); the recent improvement in the Court’s approach (espe-
cially with regard to fundamental rights protection), as shown by the Lopes Da Silva and I. B. decisions. There-
after, I present other mutual recognition instruments on detention. The latter, though not yet subject to a refer-
ence to the CJEU, are capable of actually affecting the role of nationality, when spending a period in detention 
is at stake. 
 
3.1.1 Actual interactions  
Kozlowski41 and Wolzenburg42 revolved around the interpretation of Article 4(6) of EAW FD. Such a provision 
allows the national judge to refuse the execution of a EAW, where ‘the requested person is staying in, or is a 
national or a resident of the executing Member State and that State undertakes to execute the sentence or 
detention order in accordance with its domestic law’. Kozlowski regarded a Polish national who was convicted 
to a custodial sentence in Germany in 2006. In 2007 the Polish authorities issued an EAW against him for 
another conviction. The core of the reference regarded the function to be attached to Article 4(6) EAW FD and 
the meaning of the terms ‘resident’ and ‘staying in’. The AG put in relief the relevant function of this rule, that 
                                                 
40 For reflections on the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and the EAW L. Marin,’A Spectre Is Haunting 
Europe’: European Citizenship in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. Some Reflections on the Principles of Non-Discrimina-
tion (on the Basis of Nationality), Mutual Recognition, and Mutual Trust Originating from the European Arrest Warrant, in European 
Public Law, Vol. 17, Issue 4, pp. 705-728. 
41 Case C-66/08 Kozlowski, [2008] ECR I-6041. 
42 For comments see E. Herlin-Karnell, Case comment Wolzenburg C-123/08, The Modern Law Review, 73(5), p. 824; V. Mitsilegas, 
The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow 
Emergence of the Individual, in Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2012), pp. 338 onwards; T. Marguery, EU citizenship and 
European Arrest Warrant: The Same Rights for All?, in Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 2011, Volume 27, Issue 
73, Case Note, pp. 84–91; C. Janssen, The Principle of Mutual Recognition, op. cit., pp. 207 onwards. 
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is to say facilitating the reintegration of the convicted person at the end of his sentence. Though not expressly 
stated in the FD, such a function may be inferred from a number of elements. Generally speaking, both at EU  
and CoE  levels it has been stated that prison sentences are intended to have a corrective and a social rehabili-
tation function, and that their main objective is the human and social reintegration of the prisoner. In these 
documents the Member States hold that imprisonment regime should not cause the detainee to feel excluded 
from the community. This is possible when detention conditions help the person concerned preserve his family 
life, as well as (re)acquire employment at the end of the sentence. Moreover, the AG highlighted that the 
reintegration of the person concerned should be a central interest of the Member States in preventing crime, as 
the prisoner will come back to society once the sentence has been served. The more the rehabilitative function 
works, the less the likelihood that the person concerned will re-offend. 
Drawing the boundaries of the concepts of ‘staying in’ or being ‘a resident of’ is key to correctly interpreting 
Article 4(6). Firstly, those expressions have to be independently and uniformly defined at EU level. In partic-
ular, the concept of residence has been defined in a number of EU measures, but it has to be interpreted in light 
of the aim of the provision in which it is mentioned. In this case, the national judge should bear in mind the 
link between the place where a person is serving a prison sentence and the chance to be reintegrated into the 
society. That being so, the executing judicial authority must examine all the facts relevant to the individual 
situation of the person concerned. On the one hand, elements are to be considered such as family and social 
links, use of the language, the availability of a place to live, having a job, and the length of residence in the 
State, together with the intention of the person concerned to stay there when he is no longer held in custody.  
On the other, the circumstance that the requested person is being held in custody or that he systematically 
commits crimes in the executing State does not automatically exclude him from the scope of Article 4(6), 
provided that he/she: is a citizen of the Union; has not been delivered an expulsion decision adopted in com-
pliance with EU law.  
The Court agreed with the AG, as to the reintegrative function of Article 4(6). Concerning the meaning of 
resident and staying in, the CJEU found that the former covers those situations in which the requested person 
has established his actual place of residence (intended as the main center of interests) in the executing Member 
State. On the other side, the same person is ‘staying’ when, following a stable period of presence in that State, 
he has acquired connections with it which are of a similar degree to those resulting from residence. In order to 
establish whether this is the case, the national court must take into consideration factors such as the length, 
nature and conditions of presence and the family and economic connections which that person has with the 
executing Member State . 
A significant involution in the Court’ approach can be seen in Wolzenburg. The case regarded a German na-
tional who moved from Germany to Netherlands in 2005 with his wife, and who was employed and then began 
an apprenticeship therein. In 2006, the German authorities issued a EAW against Mr Wolzenburg. The refer-
ring court asked for a preliminary ruling related to the compatibility of the Dutch law implementing the EAW 
FD with the latter EU instrument. The Dutch law distinguished between Dutch and other nationals. As for the 
first category, the refusal of the execution was automatic. However, should the warrant have involved a non-
Dutch national, the domestic judge should have verified whether or not the person concerned was in possession 
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of a residence permit of indefinite duration, achievable by virtue of Article 16 of the Citizenship Directive 
(namely after five years of residence therein). Therefore, at stake there was in particular the compatibility of 
such a distinction: with Article 4(6); the principle of non discrimination. The AG regarded the national law as 
detrimental to the reintegrative function from a twofold perspective. For nationals of the executing State, since 
the judge could not consider whether the person concerned had with that state only a formal connection in 
terms of nationality. For nationals of other Member States, which are staying in or resident of the executing 
Member State, but have not acquired yet a residence permit of indefinite duration. Such an approach would 
exclude from the application of Article 4(6) all those individuals who are not yet (formally) resident, but who 
are ‘staying’ therein, having established familiar social and working links in the executing State. Furthermore, 
the national law would be contrary to the principle of non discrimination, which requires that comparable 
situations must not be treated differently unless such treatment is objectively justified and proportionate. 
Lastly, it would manifestly sit at odds with the structure and objectives of Article 4(6), under which nationals 
of other Member States are to be treated in the same way as nationals of the executing State . 
Unfortunately, the Court regarded such a difference of treatment as falling under the margin of discretion 
granted to Member States by Article 4(6). The Member State of execution is therefore entitled to pursue the 
reintegration objective only with those persons who have demonstrated a certain degree of integration in the 
society of that Member State. This allows the refusal of surrendering a Member State’s nationals, as well as 
the requirement of a five-year period of residence in that state for other EU citizens. The Court stated that 
Article 4(6) precludes a Member State from making the application of that ground for refusal subject to the 
possession of a permanent residence permit. However, it found that the principle of non discrimination does 
non preclude the refusal of executing the EAW against its own nationals, while requiring other EU citizens to 
have lawfully resided therein for a continuous period of five years. 
In Lopes Da Silva43, the CJEU was asked as to the compatibility of the French law implementing the EAW FD 
with the principle of non-discrimination. In particular, the national legal regime automatically excluded non-
French nationals from the scope of Article 4(6). As a preliminary point, the AG referred to Article 1(3) EAW 
FD, where it is stated that the FD ‘shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental 
rights and fundamental legal principles’ as enshrined in European Union law’. Then, he opined that protecting 
dignity of the sentenced person should be the ‘overriding concern’ of Member States (when implementing/ap-
plying EU law) and the CJEU (when fulfilling its interpretative task)44. In this sense, Article 4(6) clearly con-
veys the need to reach a balance between the smooth functioning of mutual recognition and the achievement 
of detainees’ rehabilitation. The French law ran counter that objective, as was based on the assumption that 
only nationals of that state can have the connection required by Article 4(6). That argument could not be 
accepted for three main reasons: it was contradicted by the same wording of the FD; derogations from the 
                                                 
43 Case C-42/11, Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued against João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge, 
5 September 2012, para 49. 
44 Lopes Da Silva, AG’s Opinion, para 28. 
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principle of non-discrimination may be allowed where they comply with the principle of proportionality, which 
was not the case in Lopes Da Silva; freedom of movement and residence defies ‘the presumption that a sen-
tenced person has the best chance of reintegrating into society only in the State of which he is a national’45. 
The Court recognised the function underlying Article 4(6), and found that Member States must exercise their 
discretion consistently with the duty to respect fundamental rights laid down in the FD46. Furthermore, Member 
States cannot exclude a non-national from the scope of Article 4(6), without allowing an individual assessment. 
A further improvement in the Court’s approach is given by I. B47, which revolved around the interpretation of 
Article 5(1)48 and (3). Those provisions respectively allowed to make the surrender conditional to: the possi-
bility to apply for a retrial, where the EAW was based on a judgment delivered in absentia; the condition that 
the surrendered is returned to the executing state, when s/he is a national or resident of the latter. The EAW 
had been issued under Article 5(1), but I. B. was also a resident of the executing Member State. Therefore, the 
question arose as to what paragraph was applicable in that case. In order to solve the dilemma, the AG stated 
that the FD must be applied by balancing the streamlining of judicial cooperation with the protection of fun-
damental rights. The latter indeed was regarded as a precondition giving ‘legitimacy to the existence and 
development of the [AFJS]’49. In particular, at stake there was the objective of ‘enabling the executing judicial 
authority to give particular weight to the possibility of increasing the requested person’s chances of reintegrat-
ing into society when the sentence imposed on him expires’50. In the absence of an explicit say from the word-
ing of the provision, an interpretation should be given so as not to conflict with the FD’s aims just described. 
The CJEU espoused the AG’s Opinion. Firstly it recognised that both Articles 4(6) and 5(3) have the function 
of increasing the chances for the person concerned to be reintegrated into the society. In this respect, nothing 
in the FD indicates that persons convicted in absentia – so falling under the scope of Article 5(1) - should be 
excluded from that objective. Nor the guarantee that the surrender is made conditional upon the possibility of 
a retrial can affect in any way the pursuit of that function. Quite the contrary, that guarantee would permit the 
case to be retried, so rendering that surrender a surrender for the purposes of criminal prosecution, which is 
the situation envisaged by Article 5(3). 
 
3.1.2 Potential interactions 
                                                 
45 Ibidem, para 51.  
46 Lopes Da Silva, Court’s judgment, para 34. 
47 Case C- 306/09, I.B., ECR [2010] I-10341. 
48 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 
2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, OJ L 81/24, 27.3.2009.Ar-
ticle 5(1) has been deleted and substituted by the legal framework provided for in FD 2009/299/JHA.   
49 I. B., AG’s Opinion, para 43. 
50 Kozlowski, para 45, and Wolzenburg, para 62.  
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To examine the potential interactions between EU criminal law and EU citizenship, one has to consider specific 
instruments related to detention adopted by the EU: the Framework Decisions on post-conviction supervision 
measures, on recognition of probation orders and alternative (non-custodial) sanctions, on custodial sen-
tences51. These instruments give rise to some considerations, as to their potential impact on EU citizenship. 
For instance, the FD on custodial sentences foresees, in certain cases, the transfer of prisoners from a Member 
State to another without requiring the consent of the sentenced person. The transfer may take place, inter alia, 
when the executing State is where the sentenced person lives. Such potential obligation is grounded in the 
presumption that the social rehabilitation will better take place in the executing State52. The system built on by 
the FD may attach to imprisonment drawbacks deemed too severe. Once the consent of the prisoner has been 
removed, the occurrence of a circumstance provided for in the FD would suffice to force the person out of the 
Member State where he/she is staying. In this respect, such a measure has been seen as resembling an expulsion 
from the Member State, but divested of the guarantees of the Directive 2004/38/EC53.  
Admittedly, the FD allows for a compulsory transfer, e.g. to the Member State where the prisoner lives. There 
seems to be required a rather strong link with the State in question. It then might be difficult if, for instance, 
the person concerned has already acquired the right of residence in the host Member State, at the moment 
he/she is imprisoned therein. Nonetheless, the risk may be that the FD lends itself to abuses. First and foremost, 
it is not clear which is the meaning of ‘living’: whether it may be equated with ‘residing’ or not, and what 
follows from either cases. Articles 27 and 28 of the Citizenship Directive authorise expulsion of an EU citizen 
(namely, forcedly moving him/her from the host Member State) only when: an individual assessment has been 
carried out; the expulsion decision has been adopted on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health. These two circumstances are always required, also when no right of residence has been reached by the 
EU citizen. Furthermore, pursuant to the Directive, previous criminal convictions per se may never constitute 
grounds for taking expulsion measures. In this context, the FD makes no helpful references to Directive 
2004/38/EC, save where the preamble states that the FD should be applied in accordance with the Citizenship 
Directive54. Which may be the consequences of such a statement remains unclear, since one may object that 
the transfer of a EU citizen from a host Member State might run counter the requirements laid down in the 
Citizenship Directive.  
                                                 
51 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application, between Member States of the European Union, 
of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention OJ L294/20, 
11.11.2009; Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions OJ L337/102, 
16.12.2008; Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their 
enforcement in the European Union OJ L327/27, 5 December 2008. 
52 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, Article 6(2).  
53 See on these aspects V. Mitsilegas, The third wave of third pillar, in European Law Review, (2009) 34, pp. 541 onwards. 
54 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, recital 16. 
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Turning to the FD on probations decisions, it slightly increases the involvement of the detainee. The FD pro-
vides that the recognition of a probation measure is carried out as long as: the sentenced person has returned 
or wants to return to the State in which he/she is ‘lawfully and ordinarily residing’; the individual has opted 
for another Member State, with the latter having allowed for the execution55. Also in this case, the residence 
is put in the limelight. The concept at issue seems to fulfil a pivotal role, within the framework of the FD. The 
instrument discussed might significantly contribute to the social reintegration of the convicted person, with the 
latter being allowed to serve the sentence in the Member State where he/she is mainly linked. This appears 
even more true on considering that the detainee may express a preference, with regard to the Member State 
which should recognise the measure. On the other side, doubts arise as to which meaning is to be given to 
‘lawful and ordinary residence’. It should be noted that Directive 2004/38/EC is not mentioned at all. The same 
holds true for any other secondary law instruments. So as things stand at present, there are no legal references 
capable of clarifying how to interpret the FD. Whether a relation of residence between the prisoner and the 
Member State in question may be triggered by the sole individual preference. Whether the assessment must be 
grounded on objective factors, and if so, which such elements should be. One may hold the ‘residence’ as 
outlined by the CJEU in Koslowski or Wolzenburg, but no indications are supplied in this respect.  
 
Intermediate conclusions  
The (actual and potential) interactions between EU criminal law and EU citizenship reveal the importance of 
the concepts of residence, integration and reintegration to the research question of this paper. Under Article 
4(6) EAW FD, the state undertakes the reintegration of prisoners on the basis of a link other than that of 
nationality, namely the residence or the staying in of the person concerned. The AG stated that residence is a 
manifold concept, which changes according to the function of the provision in which it is mentioned. The 
possibility for the person concerned to rely on the concept of staying in is groundbreaking. Residence has 
become a recurrent element and is referred to in many instruments of EU law. Whereas the ‘staying in’ factor 
testifies how the role of nationality links is being reshaped even in a nation-based area such as that of individ-
uals’ rehabilitation. This is confirmed by the FDs on transfer of prisoners and on probation measures, where 
for the purposes of facilitating the reintegration of the detainee, he/she may serve the sentence in the country 
where they live/are lawfully and ordinarily residing. As reintegration logically presupposes integration, the 
latter is the substantive link required with the state dealing with the rehabilitation. Such an approach based on 
the verification of the effective relation with the Member State concerned might ensure a higher protection to 
prisoners, rather than a formal perspective only grounded on the formal link constituted by nationality.  
However one may not ignore a number of shadows hanging over this picture. The first aspect regards the 
uncertainty surrounding the reach of residence. On the one hand, the Court in Kozlowski did not explicitly 
embrace the manifold nature of residence proposed by the AG. On the other, there has not been so far the 
opportunity to clarify the meaning of lawfully and ordinarily residing and (mostly) living. As the purpose of 
                                                 
55 Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA, Article 5. 
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these provisions is the personal rehabilitation, their interpretation in the sense of Kozlowski should naturally 
follow. However, the Court has not spent words on the relationship between the concept of residence and the 
aims of the provision in which it is alluded to. This need for clarity is further required by the removal of 
prisoners’ consent as to his/her transfer: more precisely, the detainee has no role to play on his rehabilitation 
process, where one of the circumstances provided for in the concerned FD takes place.  
Moreover, the concrete application of Article 4(6) in Wolzenburg represents a step back in EU prisoners pro-
tection. In Kozlowski, the Court distinguished between resident and staying in, by implicitly admitting that the 
provision in question may apply even to whom is not properly a resident in the host Member State. In Wolzen-
burg this commendable approach is forgotten. The irrefutable presumption of integration when it comes to 
nationality is legitimised. Concerning other EU citizens, the outcome of the judgment is even more paradoxi-
cal. Article 4(6) precludes the requirement of a residence permit of indefinite duration, but the principle of 
non-discrimination allows the condition of having resided for a continuous five-year period in the executing 
state: which is, however, the term provided for in the Citizenship Directive to acquire the right to permanent 
residence in the host Member State. This nonetheless, some commentators have welcomed the Court’s ap-
proach in Wolzenburg, as ‘[t]o overcome the old system built on sovereignty and nationality and to provide 
for equal treatment based on mutual recognition in a Union-wide area of justice, is a task to be pursued through 
thorough steps of EU legislation which also provides for the necessary preconditions (i.e. sufficient approxi-
mation) […] Once again we have to remember that mutual recognition which deprives citizens of rights they 
formerly had (here: the special protection as a national) cannot be boldly decreed by primary law but must be 
carefully provided for, step by step, by responsible legislation which guarantees a sufficient level of protection 
to the individual’56. In this respect, one should recall that since then two major changes has occurred, with 
regard to mutual trust, on the one hand, and protection of fundamental rights in relation to the EAW FD, on 
the other. As to the former, the Court has recognised that the presumption of respect of fundamental rights by 
all Member State, on which mutual trust and mutual recognition are based, is a refutable one. Concerning the 
latter, three Directives have been adopted, which approximate fundamental aspects of criminal procedure and 
also regard the execution of a EAW: namely, the Directives on the rights to interpretation and translation, to 
information and to access to a lawyer57. 
Furthermore, Wolzenburg can be seen as an exception also in light of the subsequent CJEU’s case-law on 
Articles 4(6) and 5(3). In Lopes Da Silva, the compatibility of an automatic exclusion of non-nationals from 
the scope of application of Article 4(6) was ruled out. Furthermore, the importance of applying and interpreting 
the EAW in compliance with fundamental rights was referred to. I. B. was issued in the wake of the same 
                                                 
56 M. Möstl, Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition, in (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review, Issue 2, p. 422. 
57 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in 
criminal proceedings, OJ 280/1, 26.10.2010; Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on 
the right to information in criminal proceedings, OJ L 142/1, 1.6.2012; Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and 
on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular 
authorities while deprived of liberty, OJ L 294/1, 6.11.2013. 
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spirit. However, there is a passage in the AG’s Opinion in Kozlowski which should not be underestimated. I 
am referring to the fact that the commission of a crime in the host Member State does not automatically pre-
clude the application of Article 4(6), and more in general the pursuit of the reintegrative function, unless the 
person has been subject to an expulsion measure.  
This leads the discussion to the second scenario, where national criminal law and EU citizenship meet. As 
stated above, the two scenario are inextricably linked in a circular relationship. On theory, a person could 
benefit from Article 4(6) and accede to the chance of reintegration after s/he has demonstrated a certain grade 
of connection with the host Member State. In this respect, the inevitable question arises as to when crime and 
imprisonment can affect that connection. The response(s) draw the scope of application of Article 4(6) (and of 
many citizenship rights), so that a careful assessment is needed. This is even more true when considering that, 
according to the AG, the presence of an expulsion measure deprives the person of the possibility to benefit 
from Article 4(6). Therefore, the focus necessarily shifts to the impact that detention can have on the integra-
tion link.  
This issue emerges in a broader context, which regards the development of the Court’s approach to the meaning 
of integration, and the factors lying behind it. That being so, I now move on to the second scenario. Before 
dealing with the rulings specifically related to the topic of this paper, I locate this case-law in the broader trend 
just referred to. I conclude that the interpretation of the concept of integration is undergoing a significant 
involution. Criminal law and detention play a significant role in this respect, as they show the current under-
standing of that concept is rather removed for reality. 
 
3.2.1 Interactions between EU citizenship and national criminal law  
The second scenario focuses on the interactions between national criminal law and EU citizenship. However, 
the CJEU’s rulings analysed below are not isolated cases. They are consistent with a wider trend concerning 
the Court’s approach to EU citizenship, which brings to the fore the relationship between duties and rights in 
EU citizenship. The debate on this topic is not new58. However, it has been recently fed by Kochenov’s article, 
in which he contends that no citizenship duties can be identified at EU law level59. A more nuanced argument 
is put forward by those arguing that the existence of duties in EU citizenship would depend on the understand-
ing of limits and conditions. Indeed, more than once those limits and conditions have been expressed as obli-
gations or responsibilities60. Such a discussion is of the utmost importance. As I show, the construction of 
                                                 
58 See among many J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Europa: “Nous coalisons des Etats, nous n’unissons pas des hommes”’, in M. Cartabia and A. 
Simoncini (eds), La sostenibilità della democrazia nel XXI secolo (Il Mulino, 2009); R. Davis, ‘Citizenship of the Union . . . Rights 
for All?’ (2002) 27 European Law Review, 121 
59 See, as a latest example, D. Kochenov, EU Citizenship without Duties, in European Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 4, July 2014, pp. 
482–498. For a reply, see R. Bellamy, A Duty-Free Europe? What’s Wrong with Kochenov’s Account of EU Citizenship Rights, in 
European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 2015, pp. 558–565.  
60 N. Niamh Shuibhne, Limits rising, duties ascending: The changing legal shape of Union citizenship, Common Market Law Review 
52: 889–938, 2015. 
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duties/obligations/responsibilities in the CJEU’s decisions often brings with it reflections on the meaning of 
individual integration in the host Member State. In that context, the commission of criminal offences and the 
respect of national criminal laws can have a heavy impact on citizenship rights.  
Broadly speaking, over the last years the Court’s case-law on the subject matter has seen a shift from the 
traditional rights-strengthening interpretation of EU citizenship (and in particular of Directive 2004/38) to a 
more restrictive approach. As highlighted by Niham Shuibhne in a comprehensive and detailed review61, this 
development has regarded three main areas: equal treatment and access to social assistance62; permanent resi-
dence; protection against expulsion. In particular, in the last two threads the Court has made an interesting use 
of the integration argument. As stated, the present scenario focuses on the interaction between national criminal 
law and EU citizenship, and is concerned with the achievement of permanent residence (Onuekwere) and pro-
tection against the expulsion (Tsakouridis, P. I. and M. G.). However, it is appropriate to place this analysis 
within the broader context of the development in the Court’s case-law on the topic.  
The starting point in the Court’s view is that the achievement of citizenship right comes with integration, with 
the latter resting not only on quantitative and territorial factors, but also on qualitative elements. Therefore, 
one must evaluate the degree of integration of the person concerned in the host Member State. For instance, 
Dias concerned a person who had been granted a residence permit in compliance with the EC legislation at the 
time. After that, the personal conditions of the holder made him fall outside the qualifications for the issue of 
such a permit (she was voluntarily unemployed and not self-sufficient). The Court found applicable Article 
16(4), according to which permanent residence can be lost only through absence from the host Member State 
for a period exceeding two consecutive years. The CJEU stated that event though Article 16(4) ‘refers only to 
absence from the host Member State, the integration link between the person concerned and that Member State 
is also called into question in the case of a citizen who, while having resided legally for a continuous period 
of five years, then decides to remain in that Member State without having a right of residence […] As the 
situations are comparable, it follows that the rule laid down in Article 16(4) […] must also be applied by 
analogy to periods in the host Member State completed on the basis solely of a residence permit […] without 
the conditions governing entitlement to a right of residence […] having been satisfied’63. Two main conclu-
sions can be drawn from these statements. Firstly, according to the Luxembourg Court the residence permit 
has a declaratory value, rather than constitutive of rights. Secondly, defining the qualitative elements of inte-
gration can be highly controversial. The quality of integration seems capable of determining the legality of 
residence. This is key since both the meaning of legal residence and the right to residence underlie many 
provisions of EU law, capable of seriously affecting the person concerned. A question arises in this respect: 
on what (legal?) conditions is residence good enough, for the purposes of acquiring EU citizenship rights?  
                                                 
61 Idibem, pp. 900 onwards. 
62 See in particular C-333/13 of 11 November 2014, Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, nyp. 
63 Case C-325/09, Dias, ECR [2011] I-06387, paras 63–65. 
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In a way, the Ziolkowski and Sjeja case provides an answer. Therein, the Court was asked as to whether periods 
of residence spent in the host Member State without fulfilling the conditions of Article 7 (having sufficient 
resources) can be considered as ‘legal’. The CJEU found that ‘[i]t follows that the concept of legal residence 
implied by the terms have resided legally in Article 16(1) […] should be construed as meaning a period of 
residence which complies with the conditions laid down in the directive, in particular those set out in Article 
7(1)’64. Such a statement should not be underestimated, since it links the legality of residence to the fulfillment 
of obligations which are not immediately inferable from the relevant law. This is the case either  or not the 
interpreted rules belong to the Citizenship Directive. One can see it in Alarape and Tijani, where the possible 
achievement of permanent residence for children educated in the host Member State was at stake. Indeed, 
Regulation 492/2011/EU65 authorises the residence of migrant workers’ children who are in education. They 
are exempted from the requirement of having sufficient resources, as provided for in Article 7 of the Citizen-
ship Directive. However, the Court denied that their residence can trigger a right to permanent residence, as 
they do not meet the conditions of Article 766.  
An exception to this trend can be found in a number of judgments regarding the application of Decision No 
1/8067. The latter provides Turkish workers and their family members with employment rights within the EU, 
depending on the duration of their time spent in legal employment or the legal residence in the host Member 
State68. Such rights may be limited on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. As the Deci-
sion is silent as to the impact that deprivation of liberty could have on these provisions, the Court was asked 
to rule on this issue in the Nazli, Dogan, Aydinly and Cetinkaya69 cases. Two main features are to be pointed 
out. Firstly, the persons concerned had already acquired the rights at stake under the Decision. Secondly, in 
two cases the applicants were subject to expulsion, since the nature of the offence committed, the duration of 
                                                 
64 Joined cases C-424/10 and C-425/10, Tomasz Ziolkowskiand Barbara Szeja and Others v Land Berlin, ECR [2011] I-14035, para 
46.  
65 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Union, OJ L141/1, 27.5.2011. 
66 Case of 8 May 2013, C-529/11, Olaitan Ajoke Alarape and Olukayode Azeez Tijani v Secretary of State for the Home Department. 
Strikingly, the AG found that the qualitative integration lying behind the right to permanent residence is measured ‘exclusively in the 
light of the condition of financial autonomy’ (para 80). 
67 Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association, signed by Member 
States of the (then) EEC and the Community and the Republic of Turkey, set up with the Council Decision 64/732/EEC of 23 December 
1963 (OJ 1973 C 113, p. 1; ‘the Association Agreement’). 
68 Such rights include: responding to any offer of employment after they have been legally resident for at least three years in that 
Member State; enjoyment of free access to any paid employment of their choice provided they have been legally resident there for at 
least five years. 
69 Case C-340/97, Ömer Nazli, Caglar Nazli and Melike Nazli v Stadt Nürnberg [2000] ECR I-00957; Case C-138/13 of 10 July 2014, 
Naime Dogan v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, not yet published; Case C-C-373/03, Ceyhun Aydinli v Land Baden-Württemberg [2005] 
I-06181; Case C-467/02, Inan Cetinkaya v Land Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECR I-10895. 
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the custodial sentence, or a combination of both, triggered such coercive measure under the national law in 
question. 
The Court found that, for being effective, the employment rights must be accompanied by a concomitant right 
to residence which does not depend on the continuing existence of the conditions for access to those rights70. 
Secondly, in none of these cases imprisonment was regarded as automatically amounting to a prolonged ab-
sence from the host Member State. The Court affirmed that, though detention prevents the person concerned 
from working even for a long period, this temporary inactivity/absence does not preclude at all his subsequent 
return to working life71. This is even more true when the sentence is suspended in full, with the view to rein-
tegrating the person into society72, or most part of the conviction is substituted with drug therapy and sus-
pended73.  
These judgments are particularly interesting when compared to a recent CJEU case-law concerning the impact 
of crime and detention on EU citizenship rights, and especially that of staying in the host Member State those 
conducts notwithstanding. Indeed, the case-law I am going to discuss seems to be delivered in the wake of the 
‘restrictive’ development described first. In the decisions referred above, the Court found that compliance with 
Article 7 is a precondition of application of Article 16, even though such connection is not clearly established 
in the Citizenship Directive. When dealing with the interactions between national criminal law and EU citi-
zenship, the Court made no references to positive law in order to solve the cases. Rather, it answered the 
questions posed by means of a teleological interpretation, with the obedience to national criminal law reflecting 
the degree of integration into the host society. However, I submit that the Court’s approach is removed from 
reality, as it establishes an automatism between the commission of (any) criminal offences and the lack of 
integration of the person concerned in the host Member State. 
 
3.2.2 The cases 
Tsakouridis 
Tsakouridis74 is a Greek national who had an unlimited residence permit in Germany. After being away from 
the latter state for 16 months, he was arrested, transferred to Germany and sentenced to imprisonment for drugs 
offences. According to the Regional Administration, the conviction deprived him of the right of entry and 
residence in Germany, the reason why he was delivered an expulsion order on imperative grounds of public 
security.  
                                                 
70 Aydinly, para 25; Cetinkaya, para 31; Dogan, para 31; Nazli, para 28. See also Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris vait justitie 
[1990] ECR I-3461, paras 29 and 31;Case C-237/91 Kus v Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden [1992] ECR 1-6781, para 33, and Case C-
171/95, [1997] ECR I-00329, Recep Tetik v Land Berlin, paras 26, 30 and 31. 
71 Dogan, Court’s judgment, para 22. 
72 Nazli, Court’s judgment, paras 41-42; paras 45-48. 
73 Cetinkaya, Court’s judgment, para 39; Aydinli, Court’s judgment, para 28. 
74 Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] I-11979. 
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The AG’s Opinion shows the importance of concepts such as integration and reintegration. On the one hand, 
the Citizenship Directive provides that the longer the residence, the higher the level of integration is presumed 
to be and the more comprehensive will be the protection afforded against expulsion. On the other, reintegration 
is key to evaluating the proportionality of a removal measure following a criminal conviction. Expulsion 
should comply not only with Directive 2004/38/EC, but also with the reintegrative function of penalties, which 
represents a general principle of EU law (and of all modern legal systems) and is inextricably linked to the 
concept of human dignity75. According to the AG, the competent national authority must state in what respect 
the expulsion decision does not prejudice the rehabilitation function of the sanction.  
In this regards, a balance must be reached between the relevance to the society of the criminal conducts (look-
ing at the classification of/the level of involvement in the offence, the nature of the sanction imposed) and the 
personal circumstances of the individual concerned (taking into consideration family and working links, the 
degree of reintegration or the risk of re-offending in light of his/her conduct after the conviction). In this case, 
the personal behavior was deemed as breaking the link with the host Member State, so causing the loss of the 
right to enhanced protection76. The Court strictly followed the AG’s reasoning, and concluded that the fight 
against dealing in narcotics as part of an organised group may be or is included in the imperative grounds of 
public security, depending of whether the national judge decided to apply Article 28(2) or Article 28(3) re-
spectively77. This conclusion was also corroborated by referring to the importance that the fights against drug 
trafficking has to the EU, as shown by secondary law78. 
 
P. I. 
The same reference to EU law79 in order to legitimate its findings was made by the Court in P. I.80, which 
regarded an Italian national who was granted several residence permits in Germany since 1987. In 2006 he 
                                                 
75 Other than the EPR, the AG made reference to the ECtHR case-law according to which ‘[o]ne of the essential functions of a prison 
sentence is to protect society, for example by preventing a criminal from re-offending and thus causing further harm. At the same time, 
the Court recognises the legitimate aim of a policy of progressive social reintegration of persons sentenced to imprisonment. From that 
perspective it acknowledges the merit of measures – such as temporary release – permitting the social reintegration of prisoners’ 
(ECtHR judgment of 24 October 2002, Mastromatteo v. Italy, App. No 37703/97, para 72). 
76 Tsakouridis, AG’s Opinion, paras 50 and 131. 
77 Tsakouridis, Court’s judgment, para 56. 
78 The Court made reference in particular to Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum 
provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, OJ L 335/8, 11.11.2004.  
79 In particular, Article 83(1) of the TFEU and Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of the children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335/1, 17.12.2011.  
80 Case C-348/09 P.I. [2012] nyp. See V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Competence after Lisbon: From Securities to Functional Criminal-
isation, in Acosta Arcarazo and Murphy, EU Security and Justice Law, p. 115; L. Azoulai and S. Coutts, Restricting Union citizens’ 
residence rights on ground of public policy. Where Union citizenship and AFSJ meet: P.I., in Common Market Law Review, 50, 2013, 
pp. 553-570; D. Kochenov and B. Pirker, Deporting the Citizens Within the European Union, op. cit. 
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was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven years and six months for sexual assault, sexual coercion and 
rape of a minor. On 6 May 2008, the national authorities determined that Mr. I. had lost the right to enter and 
reside in Germany, and that he should have been expelled from Germany. The CJEU was asked as to whether 
the imperative grounds of public security contained in Article 28(3) of the Directive cover only threats posed 
to the internal and external security of the State. The AG argued that the concept of public security includes 
only crimes which transcend the individual harm caused to the victim(s). Secondly, a strong EU citizenship 
also implies the development of common means of preventing and combating delinquency. Therefore, the EU 
as an area of freedom security and justice cannot be constructed on the basis of merely returning any severely 
punished offender to the Member State of origin, solely on grounds of the penalty imposed81. 
On the other side, the AG found that the integration of a Union citizen is based on territorial, time and quali-
tative factors. As ‘Mr I.’s conduct shows a total lack of desire to integrate into the society in which he finds 
himself and some of whose fundamental values he so conscientiously disregarded for years’, he cannot rely 
on the right to enhanced protection against expulsion where that right would derive from criminal conduct 
constituting a serious disturbance of the public policy of the host Member State. Astonishingly, the Court 
interpreted the imperative grounds of public security also as referring to particularly serious threats to one of 
the fundamental interests of society, so leaving the national judge free to consider whether this was the case. 
 
Onuekwere and M. G. 
Onuekwere82 and M. G. may be seen as follow-ups of such an approach. Onuekwere concerned a Nigerian 
national with who was conferred upon a five-year residence permit in the UK in 2000. Between that year and 
2008, he was sentenced to imprisonment three times, and after the last release applied for a permanent resi-
dence permit. The CJEU was firstly asked as to whether imprisonment time may be included in the five-year 
period required for the right to permanent residence in the host Member State. Should such a timeframe not be 
considered, the Court was then called upon to decide whether the periods of detention interrupt the continuity 
of the five-year period of residence provided in Article 16 of the Directive. 
The AG regarded the integration into the host Member State as a requirement, with the residence representing 
a test for assessing the rate of integration of the individual in the Member State. Criminal conducts show that 
the person has no desire to integrate into the society of the host Member State, for his behavior disregards 
societal values as expressed in national criminal law. As a result, the AG suggested that imprisonment cannot 
be qualified as legal residence and may not be taken into account in the calculation of the period of five years83. 
Furthermore, he found that no discretion should be left to the national judge in this respect, as the European 
                                                 
81 P. I., AG’s Opinion, paras 38-46.  
82 Case C-378/12 of 16 January 2014, Onuekwere v. Secretary of State for Home Department. See S. Coutts, Union citizenship as 
probationary citizenship: Onuekwere, in Common Market Law Review, 52, 2015, pp. 531–546.  
83 Onuekwere, AG’s Opinion, paras 46-57. 
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Union legislature is to establish to what extent imprisonment may count for the purposes of Article 16 of 
Directive84. 
In the wake of the AG’s Opinion, the CJEU rebuffed that the time spent in prison can have any value for the 
purpose of the meaning of legal residence. The Court found that EU citizenship regards the integration as a 
precondition of the acquisition of the right of permanent residence, based on territorial, temporal and qualita-
tive elements. On that ground, the CJEU answered that the time spent in detention may not be included in the 
period of five years referred to in the Directive. A prison sentence ensues from a violation, by the person 
concerned, of Member States’ criminal law, which in turn enshrines the societal values of that State. Thus, 
such a conviction would be a denial of genuine integration, and allowing for the permanent residence in spite 
of that circumstance would run counter to the aim of the Directive. Furthermore, the CJEU held that detention 
interrupts the continuity of residence85, for a criminal conduct would deny the integration requirement. 
M. G.86 concerned a Portuguese national who entered the United Kingdom with her Portuguese husband on 12 
April 1998 and in 2009 she was sentenced to months of imprisonment on one count of cruelty and three counts 
of assault against her sons. In 2010 she was delivered a deportation order on grounds of public policy and 
public security. According to the decision, Ms. G. was not entitled to enhanced protection against expulsion, 
the latter depending on the integration of the Union citizen in the host Member States; such integration could 
not have taken place, while a period of imprisonment had occurred. 
The First-tier Tribunal allowed the appeal made by Ms. G, which decision was challenged by the Secretary of 
State before the referring court, which decided to stay the proceedings and to ask the following questions to 
the Court of Justice: when does the calculation of the ten-year period under Article 28(3)(a) start? Must that 
period be continuous? If so, does imprisonment interrupt such continuity, even when the person concerned has 
resided in the host Member State for 10years prior to the imprisonment?  
The provision involved in the case was Article 28(3) of the Directive. As said above, such a provision legiti-
mates the expulsion of Union citizens or his/her family members who have resided in the host Member State 
for 10 years prior to the expulsion only if there are imperative grounds of public security. The Court interpreted 
the rule as requiring that a Union citizen resided in the host Member State for the 10 years preceding the 
expulsion decision, on the one hand; on the other, that such period must, in principle, be continuous87. Against 
that backdrop, periods of imprisonment cannot be taken into account for the purposes of granting the enhanced 
protection and, in principle, interrupt the continuity of the period of residence for the purposes of that provi-
sion88. 
                                                 
84 Ibidem, para 72. 
85 Onuekwere, Court’s judgment, paras 24-32. 
86 Case C-400/12 of 16 January 2014, M.G. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, nyp. 
87M. G. judgment, para 28. 
88 Ibidem, para 33. 
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According to the Court, the system of protection against expulsion measures, like the right to permanent resi-
dence, is based on the degree of integration of the persons concerned in the host Member State89. The CJEU 
cited Onuekwere, and stated that a person sentenced to imprisonment, by violating Member State’s criminal 
law, has disregarded the societal values of that Member State90. However, the fact that the person concerned 
has resided in the host Member State during the 10 years prior to imprisonment may be taken into consideration 
as part of the overall assessment for determining whether the enhanced protection will be granted91. 
 
Intermediate conclusions 
The case-law just presented is highly controversial. Also in this cases the relevance of integration and reinte-
gration emerges, with regard to the relationship between detention and EU citizenship. In Tsakouridis the AG 
states that the expulsion of a EU citizen from the host Member State must not jeopardize the reintegrative 
function of criminal sanctions. This is especially the case when the person concerned has lived therein for a so 
long time that he has acquired the rights provided for in the Citizenship Directive. Such an integration-based 
approach was reaffirmed by the AG in P. I. The need for a shared fight against delinquency within the EU also 
implies that Member States develop a common undertaking of rehabilitation of wrongdoers, and not only of 
their own nationals. However both the AG and the Court concluded in a way which is in sharp contrast with 
those promising premises. To this end, crime and imprisonment put in the limelight how far EU citizens are 
from an effective integration: they are integrated, but deprivation of liberty breaks that link (Tsakouridis); they 
might have been integrated due to the time passed, but this has occurred only for their crimes had not been 
detected yet (P. I.); they are not integrated that time spent in the host Member State notwithstanding, as a part 
of it was passed in prison (Onuekwere and M. G.). Furthermore, in Tsakouridis the AG made reference to the 
need for the expulsion to be consistent with the rehabilitative function of imprisonment. However, the expul-
sion often is not a penalty but an administrative measure stemming from the loss of the right to stay in a country 
due to a criminal conviction. Moreover, the removal usually is carried out when the sentence has been served, 
at a moment when the reintegrative function should have been taken place (at least on theory). This attention 
to reintegration is commendable, but it can be misleading.  
Therefore, EU nationals may see their Union citizenship rights subject to a Damocles’ sword, perfectly em-
bodied by imprisonment. Demonstrating the establishment of an integration link with the host society is a 
precondition for such rights to be acquired and maintained. To rule on the impact of detention on personal 
integration is to rule on the entitlement of that person to important rights. This case-law is further disturbing 
as both the AG and the Court, when evaluating such impact, posed every crime on the same level without 
differentiation. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile with the mentioned judgments on Turkish workers, 
where the Court highlighted that EU law precludes an automatism between imprisonment and forfeiture of 
                                                 
89 Ibidem, para 30. 
90 Ibidem, para 31. 
91 Ibidem, paras 34-37. 
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rights already acquired. A person which has spent also several years in prison is not only on that basis pre-
cluded from reintegrating into the society. Otherwise, the same Court stated, it would sharply contrast with a 
fundamental function of criminal penalties. The two groups of rulings differ in the rights at stake: employment 
rights in one case, right to permanent residence (also as a right not to be expelled) in the other. Could this 
variance per se justify such difference of treatment? It would be preposterous, to say the least. This incon-
sistency has a detrimental effect on individuals, and this approach to EU prisoners seems to show a preoccu-
pying involution. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper I attempted to show what role prison and prisoners can have in EU law. This implied an analysis 
not only of the impact of EU citizenship law on detention, but also of the condition of detainees in EU citizen-
ship (and as EU citizens).  
My submission is that  dealing with detention-related issues (in particular the execution of the sentence) may 
no longer be based on formal criteria of nationality, but also and mostly looking upon substantive elements of 
connection with the Member State in question. Article 4(6) EAW FD, as well as the FDs on the transfer of 
prisoners and on probation measures seem to weaken such nationality-based approach. The EAW FD refers to 
‘staying in’, besides residence. However, other preoccupying circumstances may undermine the innovative 
nature of such framework. The removal of the consent when it comes to transfer a prisoner on given conditions 
-though for declared reintegration purposes- seems to look at the prisoner as a mere object of mutual recogni-
tion in the hands of Member States. The Court’s interpretation of Article 4(6) EAW FD in Wolzenburg is 
detrimental to Member States’ national and other EU citizens. Article 16 Citizenship Directive (five years of 
residence in the host Member States) is capable of defining the scope of Article 4(6). This appear to be incon-
gruous, as the latter applies to persons ‘staying in’ other than residents in the host Member State. The same 
Court acknowledged the existing difference between such two situations.  
In any case, Wolzenburg might have been an exceptional departure from the traditional approach of the Court 
on the subject. This is confirmed by the Lopes Da Silva and I. B. cases. This nonetheless, one should bear in 
mind that these rights-strengthening attitude is linked to two elements: the residence and the integration of the 
person concerned in the host Member State. This implies an assessment of the impact of crime and detention 
on those elements. 
Concerns can be voiced with regard to the Court’s interpretation in this respect. While cases such as Tsa-
kouridis and P. I. show that the integration link is always on trial, in Onuekwere and M. G. such a link is denied 
since prison is not a place where becoming integrated. Such a statement raises two main problems. Firstly, 
there seems to be an irrefutable presumption that every custodial sentence implies non-integration: all crimes 
are on the same foot. Secondly, as custodial sentences pursue a reintegration objective, one should take into 
consideration what such sentences also to serve integration purposes. After all, the outcome should not be so 
different: namely, allowing the person concerned at the end of his/her punishment to respectfully live together 
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with the rest of society. Such a conclusion would not automatically lead to the paradoxical result that the longer 
a person has passed in prison, the more integrated he/she must be considered. Indeed, there should always be 
an individual assessment of personal conduct also during imprisonment. In conclusion, one could see that the 
role of prison and prisoners is still incomplete. The importance of nationality seems to be fading, with a grow-
ing weight of reintegration purposed in an individual-oriented perspective. However, the consistency of this 
perspective requires a reconsideration of the current relationship between detention and integration, so allow-
ing detainees the enjoyment of EU citizenship to a greater extent. 
